Turkey, Nagorno-Karabakh and the South Caucasus

With the Syrian crisis and all the chaos that is presently going on in the region, including the new wave of violence committed by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), it seems a bit strange that Davutoğlu would suddenly decide to raise the Karabakh issue. Furthermore, the very suggestion is unrealistic and something of a non-starter, simply because Turkey is not viewed as a neutral actor.

Therefore, the reaction from the deputy foreign minister of Armenia, Shavarsh Kocharyan, came as little surprise. Kocharyan responded: “For the resolution of the conflict it would be productive if Turkey could encourage Azerbaijan to negotiate with the real party to the conflict, Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey at least should not continue to support the everything-or-nothing position of Azerbaijan. If the Turkish minister of foreign affairs truly wants to support the settlement of the conflict, Turkey should not attempt to distort the essence of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.”

While I would agree that Turkey cannot take on a role as mediator because it supports Azerbaijan's arguments, at the same time such a response from Armenia would make one believe that Yerevan is working around the clock to find a solution, which is clearly not the case. Yerevan is not unhappy with the status quo. It continues to control the internationally recognized Azerbaijani region of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as occupying a further seven surrounding provinces, with Yerevan facing very little international criticism or external pressure. For Azerbaijan, an independent Karabakh is not an option. For Armenia, it is the only option. As the clocks ticks along, the more entrenched the problem becomes, making the status quo more difficult to change. This in turn leads to greater frustration in Baku and more talk of taking back its lands by military force, which in turn increases the siege mentality in Yerevan, locking the conflict into a vicious circle. Turkey, being close to Azerbaijan and having no diplomatic ties with Armenia, is far from well-placed to play a mediating role in the conflict.

More broadly, Turkey would like to increase its influence in the South Caucasus, a region of growing geostrategic importance and, to this end, over the last few years, Turkey has strengthened ties economically, politically and vis-à-vis security with both Azerbaijan and Georgia. Ankara really stepped up efforts in the aftermath of the August 2008 Russo-Georgia War, which shattered the political status quo in the region. Turkey launched two initiatives that it hoped would bring about greater regional stability as well as allowing Turkey to play a larger role in regional conflicts, such as Nagorno-Karabakh.

The first was the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform and the second a process of rapprochement with Armenia, with which Turkey has had a closed border and no diplomatic ties since 1993. Both of these initiatives also came at a time when Ankara's relations with Russia were witnessing a dramatic improvement. Indeed, Turkey's foreign policy in the South Caucasus will be considerably shaped by Ankara's relations with Russia and, to a lesser extent, the EU as it takes on a great role there.

Alas, Ankara miscalculated and neither initiative bore fruit. The failed rapprochement with Armenia -- principally a consequence of Turkey deciding to link it to progress over Karabakh -- only served to increase regional tensions and undermine international efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict, resulting in a stalling of peace talks and increased cease-fire violations. Turkey underestimated the reaction of Azerbaijan to rapprochement with Yerevan and the ability of the Armenian diaspora to pressure Armenia's leadership. Ankara's credibility was damaged, relations with Azerbaijan were shaken and Armenia's leadership declared Turkey dishonest and not to be trusted. While Azerbaijan and Turkey repaired and even deepened their ties, Yerevan went on to further increase security ties with Moscow, with any new Turkish initiatives viewed more skeptically than ever.

As for the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform -- aimed at building confidence via the creation of a forum to establish dialogue among the three countries of the South Caucasus, Turkey and Russia -- it never really got off the ground. Launched without much thought, it received very little enthusiasm from most of those invited to join and excluded important international actors such as the EU and US. Therefore, it never really got off the starting block. If Turkey is really serious about being a credible regional player, it needs to find a way of getting its rapprochement with Armenia back on track and without making any link to Nagorno-Karabakh, given that it has been duly recognized that Ankara has no role to play in the solution of this conflict.