Turkey monitors Syria's chemical weapons

Syria is the only one of Turkey's neighbors that has not signed the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, a treaty banning chemical weapons production, possession, distribution and use. Hence, we do not know how comprehensive a chemical arms program Damascus has been running so far, nor do we know the specific nature or capacity of its stockpile and the exact whereabouts of these weapons.

There are only estimates from the Turkish, Arab and Western intelligence agencies that have been tracking Syrian efforts since the early 1980s. It is their assessment that Syria has a stockpile of approximately 1,000 tons of chemical weapons including mustard gas and nerve agents such as sarin and VX. Assad has stored these weapons in some 50 different cites, mostly located in the northern part of the country that is closer to the Turkish border. For example, there are weapons depots in Hama, Homs, Latakia, al-Safirah, Dumayr and Khan Abu Shamatwere, which are all believed to contain chemical weapons.

Last month, during a hearing at the Senate Armed Services Committee, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told members that the US administration had been in discussions with Turkey over their anxieties regarding chemical and biological weapons depots in Syria. He stressed that the US was concerned over Syria's stockpile of chemical weapons, which he said was “100 times worse than what we dealt with in Libya.” In the same committee, Marine Gen. James Mattis, head of the US Central Command, which covers the Middle East and Gulf region, also said, "Syria has a 'substantial chemical and biological weapons capability and thousands of shoulder-launched missiles'."

Both the use of chemical weapons by Assad's forces in the future and the possible transfer of these weapons to terrorist groups, either deliberately by the Assad government or during a chaotic breakdown of the Syrian regime, were among the talking points during the visit of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director David Petraeus, who came to Turkey unannounced in March. He met with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as well as with his counterpart, Hakan Fidan, director of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), and senior military leaders. The same issue was also brought up in the discussions during the March meeting between US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

As the only NATO member bordering Syria, Turkey is also concerned that Assad forces may use chemical weapons against civilians in besieged towns and cities as a last resort in order to escalate the humanitarian crisis and trigger a massive refugee exodus from Syria. His father, Hafez al-Assad, did not hesitate to use chemical weapons during a massacre his forces committed in Hama in 1982, which indiscriminately killed tens of thousands, including women and children. We learned our lesson when Turkey experienced a huge refugee influx from Iraq when Saddam Hussein used chemical gas in the village of Halabja in March 1988, killing thousands of Kurds. The world may see similar play by the junior Assad this time.

Ankara is also furious at Tehran for supplying chemical components to the Syrian regime for use in the weapons program in a clear violation of the UN embargo on Syria. On many occasions, Turkish authorities have had to force Iranian cargo planes flying through Turkish airspace to land at Turkish airports for inspection or have seized suspicious cargo carried by Iranian trucks overland en route to Syria. In August and March last year, Turkey intercepted an arms shipment from Iran and seized the cargo of an Iranian plane bound for Syria because it violated UN sanctions. In September 2011, Turkish naval forces intercepted a Syrian-flagged ship, but its cargo was not made public.

The most recent incident happened in early January when four Iranian trucks were stopped in Turkey's Kilis province on the border with Syria and were found to be carrying raw materials used in the making of ballistic missiles as well as 66 tons of sodium sulfate, possibly for use in the making of chemical missiles. Acting on detailed intelligence passed on by the US, Turkey has, on many occasions, halted shipments bound for Syria, but these have not been publicized.

Using its influence in the global watchdog on chemical arms, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Turkey has been silently raising the issue of chemical arms in Syria with its Western allies. The head of the OPCW is Ahmet Üzümcü, a Turkish diplomat, who was unanimously elected director-general of the organization in 2009 for a four-year term. Ankara has been providing Üzümcü with intelligence reports on chemical weapons in Syria. Unlike Israel, which has so far shied away from signing the Chemical Weapons Convention and provided an excuse for Syria to do the same, Turkey is in a strong position to lobby the world powers on a Syrian chemical threat. Ankara has already declared that it does not have any chemical weapons stockpiled since it has signed all major nonproliferation treaties including the Chemical Weapons Convention. Ankara is also an active member of many international export control regimes and works closely with the US and Western allies in preventing proliferation attempts by Syria and Iran for chemical, biological and nuclear arms.

The red flag was raised last year when Turkish intelligence discovered that Russia, a backer of the Assad regime, had sent 3 million gas masks to Syria. Officials in Ankara believe this shipment may be a sign that the regime has been preparing to use chemical weapons in an armed conflict. These masks were distributed to the regime's loyal forces, the families of soldiers and Baath supporters in December 2011. According to UN intelligence documents, South Korea reported in 2010 to the Security Council committee that was in charge of monitoring UN sanctions on North Korea that a shipment of chemical warfare protection suits from North Korea to Syria had been intercepted.

In the meantime, Turkey has been preparing for a doomsday scenario in the event of a chemical attack. The security measures around strategic vital assets like dams and water reservoirs in areas close to the Syrian border have been upgraded. The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) has already developed technologies to protect Turkish troops and civilians from chemical attacks as well as early warning and detection systems using airborne scanning devices at the Marmara Research Center. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)'s NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) schools have been mobilized to offer what the army calls “wake up” services to train the personnel on preparedness for the hazards of chemical weapons. Turkish troops on the Syrian border have been trained on a contingency plan for a possible chemical attack from Syria, and the TSK has reportedly taken the necessary precautions to prevent such a possibility.

The chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) teams attached to the General Directorate of Civil Defense have been activated in the border provinces. The TSK has deployed mobile lab units for detection and inspection of chemical, biological and nuclear threats along the Syrian border. The TSK has been monitoring the troop movements of the Syrian army with an eye on mobile missile launchers that may have the capability of firing missiles with chemical warheads. Turkey is also utilizing NATO's assets, especially an early warning radar system that was installed in Kurecik, Malatya province, as part the NATO missile shield to track Syrian missiles.

Last but not the least, Turkish officials have also been talking to the allies on the possibility of taking out a weapons depot believed to contain chemical arms in a series of surgical air strikes with the participation of Turkish, Saudi and US fighter jets. The Israelis, who are also deeply worried about chemical weapons in Syria, look to Turkey to see if there is room for cooperation on this issue. Considering the expertise of the Israeli Air Force in surgical strikes, their participation may come in handy. In any case, the plan will be put into action when securing weapons sites on the ground is no longer possible.