After the watershed

I won’t bother to list again the number of people arrested, tortured or forced into exile by the 1980 military intervention: Others have already done so in these pages. Suffice it to say that the list of atrocities is long. Beyond the suffering the coup inflicted on the individuals involved and their families, the mass arrests and the closure of political parties had a less visible but just as devastating and lasting, effect on the nation’s psyche, one that persists to this day.

In a recent interview, conservative columnist Taha Akyol put his finger on the real problem, Turkey’s authoritarian and conflict-based political culture. This confrontational approach was both a cause and a consequence of the 1980 coup. Many Turks, not fully realizing at the time the terrible human cost it would inflict, welcomed the military intervention, which put an end to years of instability that had spread to the streets. In 1982, when the junta submitted its new rigid and authoritarian constitution to popular approval, 91.4 percent of voters, more than 17 million people, voted in favor, with only 8.6 percent against. Admittedly, no alternative was on offer and voters knew that adopting the constitution was a prerequisite to a return to democratic rule, but approve it they did.

The trial of the two elderly generals, the only surviving members of the junta, and indeed the judicial procedures against Ergenekon suspects, are clearly important watersheds in Turkey’s long and winding journey toward democratization, but these measures can only take the process forward unless they are accompanied by honest self-criticism by all concerned today.

Unfortunately, as the media debate on the Evren-Şahinkaya trial has shown, a black-and-white approach to politics still reigns supreme in this country: The polarization of the society is such that some intellectuals feel the need to defend the indefensible and express support for the two generals, simply because they disapprove of the current actions of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP). Similarly, the incumbent conservative elite wants to eradicate all traces of the past militarist regime without bothering to distinguish between its genuinely anti-democratic aspects and those less harmful that could be maintained, as was demonstrated by the recent controversy over the new education system: In its determination to wipe the slate clean, the government rushed though new legislation before it had properly worked out its implementation. Yet the eight years of compulsory education were by no means the worst legacy of the “postmodern coup” of Feb. 28, 1997, even if some adjustments were needed to remove obstacles that stood in the way of imam-hatip graduates’ access to higher education.

Turkish society has changed a lot since the 1980 coup. The country is more prosperous and more open. It is also a lot more confident. But some aspects continue to resist change. Civil society is more active and outspoken, yet arrests of journalists, students and activists who speak with different voices have resumed and cast a shadow over the country.

In the first three years of its rule, the AKP pushed through important democratic changes, but as it gained the upper hand against its erstwhile opponents and won broad support from Turkish voters, it increasingly adopted a winner-takes-all approach that is undermining early positive reforms. Far from seeking consensus and social peace, the ruling party -- and indeed the other political formations in Parliament -- thrives on the conflict-culture described by Akyol. No shades of gray, no “yes, but” are considered acceptable -- nothing short of unconditional support will do. Because emotions and clan loyalties, rather than an allegiance to democratic principles, are the pillars of this confrontational political culture, Turkey’s progress is fraught with unnecessary tension and social division.

Judging by the achievements of the past decade, the country manages just fine in spite of these shortcomings. But a system that rests on powerful individuals, rather than on principles and a system of checks and balances, remains vulnerable to instability. Turkey still needs to wean itself from its fatal attraction to authoritarian power. The trial of the 1980 coup leaders is an important step, but the poisonous legacy of the military intervention will only be truly erased when Turkey becomes a country more at peace with itself and more tolerant of its cultural, political, ethnic and religious diversity, and the rights of individual citizens.