But solving the Cyprus problem is one of the most critical issues in preserving Turkey’s European Union membership perspective and enabling the process to continue. In this respect, the potential of the EU-member Greek administration to impair the process and Turkey’s failure to open its air and sea ports to this state, which is an issue that is brought up every year, are important points that need to be remembered. It’s evident that the moral superiority that Cypriot Turks have because two-thirds of them voted in the affirmative in the referendum on the Annan plan has not really changed the situation. It is for this reason that a solution in Cyprus is at least as critical as democratizing the Constitution.Mehmet Ali Talat, who became the president in 2005 by winning 55 percent of the vote, lost in the April 18 elections. Talat, who represents a perspective that can be encapsulated in the slogan “Solution and European Union,” won 43 percent of the vote while his rival, National Unity Party (UBP) leader Derviş Eroğlu, won a little over 50 percent and became the new president. These results can be assessed from various perspectives. According to one view, these results attest to the failure of policies enacted by Talat. As for the reason Talat failed, it was because he didn’t present alternative plans on what he would do if a compromise could not be reached with the Greek side. This situation further consolidated the position of the Greek side, which already has the upper hand because it is an EU member, and made Talat seem as though he was constantly making “concessions.” An example of this is his approval of a single sovereignty in a federal (united) Cyprus state, whereas now, if Eroğlu sits at the negotiation table with an alternative plan or plans and gives the impression that a solution is not an absolute must, then he will have a stronger position. According to this same view, if negotiations and the solution process are temporarily postponed, then everything is “on track,” and independently from the solution process, the administration should concentrate on solving northern Cyprus’ socio-economic problems. In brief, there is an attempt to develop an approach that says: “Finding a solution is not very important. Let us focus on our responsibilities in the North.”
This approach is not compatible with the approach Turkey adopted immediately after the 2002 elections, which brought the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to power. The AK Party’s approach on the Cyprus issue discredits the “deadlock is a solution” attitude in favor of a “we will always be a step ahead of the Greeks” attitude. As for the political tradition Eroğlu comes from, it seeks to predicate the solution process in Cyprus on the existence of two separate and sovereign states. This attitude, which can be identified with Rauf Denktaş, sees the “yes” vote on the Annan plan, which foresaw a federation in Cyprus, as almost “treachery” and dreams of a confederation between two independent states. The purpose behind this is to make the division on the island official. This formality could be called a “confederation” or a “loose federation” -- it is not too important what it’s called. If this is not possible, then the quest for ways to convince the international community to accept the current condition should be pursued with determination.
Waiting on May 26
We will have the opportunity to see whether Eroğlu will maintain this policy during the negotiation process in his first meeting, to be held on May 26. It will also shortly become clear whether the AK Party will preserve its 2002 perspective on the Cyprus problem or if it has adopted a new approach and whether this new approach includes a policy that is warm toward the idea of recognizing a two-state solution. Could Turkey be planning on using its importance, which it reckons has increased in international relations with the positive impetus of its active foreign policy approach -- which became more distinct with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu -- to support a change in attitude on the Cyprus problem? This is not yet clear. Could the criticism of “choosing the 600,000-populated southern Cyprus over the 70-million-strong Turkey,” which has been directed at the EU from time to time, be voiced a bit more strongly? Could the moral strength that comes from the Cypriot Turks being the side that wants a solution and the importance which Turkey believes it has gained in its new foreign policy strategy support this power? The answers to these questions remain unclear.
Nevertheless, limiting the solution process in Cyprus to the need to affirm the current situation (“a deadlock is a solution”) or to the notion that “the way to a solution passes through accepting the existence of two separate people and two separate sovereign states” (a two nation-state loose federation or a confederation) actually means not solving the problem. It’s important to bear in mind that the Cyprus problem is an outcome of the “nationalist conspiracy” that was created under Cold War conditions in the 1950s, which led to the fragmentation of the island between Cypriot Turks and Cypriot Greeks. The chief architects of this conspiracy were American and British forces, which reckoned that the island as a whole was susceptible to Soviet influence and that this would undermine NATO. The actors in this conspiracy can be identified as Greek fascists and the Turkish Gladio. Due to this historical development, a final solution in Cyprus cannot be a solution that perpetuates this division, which is the outcome of a conspiracy. To the contrary, a final solution to the Cyprus problem will require a close federation as envisioned in the Annan plan.
It is for this reason that an agreement between Talat and Republic of Cyprus President Dimitris Christofias on at least a federal state that has a single sovereignty and a single international identity is a remarkable improvement. Continuing the process on the basis of this agreement will keep hopes for a final solution alive. Will Eroğlu, who noted in a letter to the UN secretary-general that he intended to pursue the process within UN parameters, support the idea of a federal union? Will the AK Party, which is known for supporting Talat, continue this line? Will the Greek side see Eroğlu’s election as a new boon for Turkish nationalism and opt to continue searching for a solution from the place they left off with Talat instead of prolonging the solution process? I am hopeful that we are at the brink of a period in which we will be able to respond positively to these three questions.
* Professor Levent Köker is a lecturer at Gazi University.
