The most reliable way to do this is to compare the number of security officers in the voice recordings. And this is exactly what I did. For instance, in a recorded speech at the seminar, Yüksel Yalçın said: “There are 5,300 police officers, 4,800 gendarmerie servicemen and 240 special security officers in Bursa, Balıkesir and Yalova.”
In the file on CD No. 11 entitled “Annex B Security Forces and Special Security Organizations state of servicemen 29.01.03,” it is stated that there are 2,331 police officers, 1,659 gendarmerie servicemen, 3,188 special security organization servicemen, and 100 civilian defense servicemen in Bursa province; there are 751 police officers, 441 gendarmerie servicemen, 101 special security organization servicemen, and four civilian defense servicemen in Yalova province, and there are 2,191 police officers, 2,742 gendarmerie servicemen, 249 special security officers, and 30 civilian defense servicemen in Balıkesir province. This suggests that there are 5,273 police officers in total, 4,842 gendarmerie servicemen, and 3,538 special security officers in these three provinces. Bingo! The figures provided in the voice recording of Yalçın are consistent with the figures in the files found on CD No. 11.
The Balyoz suspects refer to these files as fake and their probable defense for these files will be similar to other defense statements made during the trial. They will most probably say that a gang listened to the voice recordings and inserted these figures. Let us accept this defense for a moment. In this case, where are the “real” lists narrating the state and number of personnel and servicemen prepared upon the order by the 1st Army division? If the list in CD No. 11 is a fake, why are the lists on the state and number of security forces servicemen not heard in the seminar voice recordings available? Why are they missing?
Let us continue to peruse the evidence admitted as authentic by the defendants in the case against the Balyoz coup plan. Suppose that a generic war scenario was being discussed at the seminar in question. Based on this assumption, we can say that they should also have discussed how the police should be used when martial law is declared. However, the voice recordings indicate that they discussed not how to use the police, but how to control them. Here are the examples: In the document titled “PLAN SEMİNERİ KAPANIŞ KONUŞMASIA5” (plan seminar closure speech A5) inside the folder titled “PLAN SEMİNERİ_2003” (plan seminar 2003) located in CD No. 5, it is said: “How can we best use the police and gendarmerie forces. We can use the gendarmerie mainly for controlling and commanding the police. To this end, we may make use of the provincial gendarmerie commands. Special squads should be formed in cooperation with the police. However, the police must be kept absolutely under control.”
In the voice recordings concerning the seminar in question, retired Col. Emin Küçükkılıç is heard saying: “In reacting to the incidents, the police department and private security organizations will be used at the behest of the military. As a general principle, the police will be controlled and commanded by the gendarmerie.”
In the voice recordings heard of the former commander of the 1st Army, Çetin Doğan, he asks how the police will be controlled: “Well, it is the duty of the police to respond to the street skirmishes... in this case, it is essential that we should take the police under control. They have weapons, vehicles and equipment. Have you formulated plans or measures for controlling or neutralizing the police, I mean the divided police, or exerting our influence on some groups within the police?”
Abdülkadir Eryılmaz, a man alleged to be member of a gang formed between the military, the police and politicians in the southeastern city of Hatay, replies: “Sir, we are planning to use them under the supervision of the gendarmerie and keep them under tight control. In particular, there is talk that problems may arise from notifying some groups about our operations or warning them in advance.” The former chief of the İstanbul Central Command, Gen. Gafur Aksu says, in addition: “We can take 4,000 police officers under control in İstanbul, sir. But I have personal concerns about how the police officers from the intelligence, narcotics and other branches will act. And we cannot control them as there are plainclothes police officers in all cities.”
Retired Gen. Ergin Saygun says: “All of them were the people who would perform ritual prayers on tables and wear clogs and live in apartments. And the people who would visit or replace them were from the same vein. When this team would go from the political power, they would go as well. When they would assume the power back, the same team would come.” Here he implies that the police officers are pious during the term of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and they must be kept under tight control.
There are many similar voice recordings. Moreover, preparation notes for the seminar in question, found in the handwriting of Doğan’s assistant Süha Tanyeri, say: “J. [Gendarmerie] should mainly be used for controlling and commanding the police, and to this end, provincial gendarmerie commands should be used.”
It is clear from the above that in the plans for the martial law which the Balyoz defendants claim they would “declare as part of a war scenario,” they discussed not how to use the police, but how to control them. Moreover, they gave instructions about this matter ahead of the seminar. They drew up lists and blacklisted people. Was all of this part of the scenario? If the government had not been overthrown and if no chaos had ensued as depicted in the scenario and if the government had declared legitimate martial law, then would the martial law command have planned how he would control the police or how he would cooperate with the police?
In this seminar which the defendants advertise as a simple war game, they discussed the ideological position of the police although they were supposed to discuss how the police can be used to ensure public security and how the police forces should be mobilized against street skirmishes. This is because the seminar was not about a war scenario, but it was a brainstorming session about how the junta can really overthrow the government.
I want to remind you once again that the foregoing information is not taken from the CDs or written documents. It is taken from the voice recordings, which the defense admitted are real and belong to them. As no one raises objection to the authenticity of these voice recordings, I am urged to ask: “Why is it so important for you to take the police under control? Is it because it is an armed organization which may oppose you when you overthrow the government?”
